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Abstract— The main aim of this work is to develop a
systematic approach for dealing with differential games
with limited communication. To this end a differential
game with limited communication is considered. The com-
munication topology is described by a directed graph.
The main components characterising the differential game
with limited communication are then identified before
the resulting game is then formally defined. Sufficient
conditions to solve the problem are identified both in the
general nonlinear case and in the linear-quadratic case. A
numerical example illustrating the theoretical approach and
results is presented. Finally, several directions for further
developments are identified.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential game theory provides a framework to
study problems in which a dynamical system is in-
fluenced by several individuals, referred to as players
[1]–[3]. A wide range of problems can be described in
this setting. For example, game theory and differential
games have traditionally played an important role in
applications related to military and defense, and eco-
nomics [4], [5]. Differential games play a role, either as
an analysis or design tool, in a variety of other areas,
such as biological systems [6]–[9], power systems [10]–
[13] and multi-agent systems [14], [15] to mention just
a few. Moreover, for the special case in which there
is only one player, a differential game boils down to
a standard optimal control problem, see for example
[16].
Unlike optimal control problems, different solution
concepts exist when studying differential game prob-
lems: two notable examples are Nash and Stackelberg
equilibrium solutions [2], [3], [17]. The most common
solution concept is the Nash equilibrium solution [1]–
[3], [18]–[20]. Within the context of Nash equilibrium
solutions it is assumed that all players are rational, are
aware of one another’s performance criteria and that
all players announce their strategies simultaneously [1],
[2]. Although this solution concept describes a wide
range of scenarios, in many practical applications the
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underlying assumption on the required exchange of
information is difficult to satisfy. For example, a player
may be ignorant about the existence of some or all
of the other players or the communication between
players may be limited. This becomes important in
certain engineering applications in which communica-
tion may be expensive or unavailable. In such settings
centralised control schemes cannot be adopted and it is
necessary to develop distributed control strategies in-
stead [21]. With this motivation it is of interest to adapt
the framework provided by differential game theory
to deal with problems in which the communication
between the players is limited.
In the literature, differential games in which the play-
ers have limited sensing abilities, i.e. the case in which
the players do not have full information regarding the
state of the system, have been studied for different
applications. For example, in [22], [23] pursuit-evasion
games with limited sensing ranges are considered.
However, there is still a need to explore and formalise
problems in which the communication between players
is limited. Stackelberg solutions for differential games
allow to study problems in which there is a certain
hierarchy between the players, i.e. the players announce
their strategies in a certain order [19], [24]. However, in
many applications the communication between players
may be even more restrictive than this. It is therefore
of interest to consider differential games with diverse
communication structures.
In this paper we consider differential games in which
the communication between agents is described by a
time-invariant, directed graph in which nodes repre-
sent players and edges represent the existence of a
communication link between two players. This graph
theoretical approach is similar to what is commonly
done when dealing with multi-agent systems with
limited communications [25].
The aim of this work is to develop a framework
to formally define and study problems with limited
information exchange between the players in a general
setting. To do this we identify which information is
exchanged between communicating players and which
assumptions are made regarding players which do not
share a communication link. We are now in a position
to define the problem and move towards developing a
framework for systematically dealing with differential
games with limited communication.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section II the differential game with limited com-
munication is introduced: the term ”limited commu-
nications” is explained in detail before the problem
formulation is defined. In Section III sufficient condi-
tions to solve the differential game are presented both
in the nonlinear case and in the linear-quadratic case.
A numerical example involving a multi-agent system
is presented to illustrate the results in Section IV. For
this particular example, it is shown that, in addition
to accommodating for limited communication between
the agents, the solution is such that the agents (players)
do not need full access to the state. Some concluding
remarks and directions for future research are given in
Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a scenario in which N > 0 players influence
a dynamical systems via the selection of their control
inputs ui(t) ∈ Rmi , i = 1, . . . , N , more commonly
referred to as control strategies within the game theoret-
ical framework. The players are denoted by subscripts
1, . . . , N . Moreover, consider the case in which the
system is input-affine with the dynamics
x˙ = f(x) + g1(x)u1 + . . . , gN (x)un , (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, with n > 0, is the state of the system,
f(x) : Rn → Rn and gi(x) ∈ Rn×mi with mi > 0, for
i = 1, . . . , N , are smooth mappings.
We assume that the origin is an equilibrium of the
system, i.e. f(0) = 0.
Each player selects its control strategy to optimise
its own performance criterion which may, or may not,
be conflicting with the performance criteria of one or
more of the other players. The objective of a player is
quantified by a cost functional which it seeks to min-
imise. In this paper we focus on feedback equilibrium
strategies, i.e. ui(t) = ui(x(t)). When considering stan-
dard feedback Nash equilibrium solutions it is assumed
that all players have information regarding the cost
functionals associated with, and strategies adopted by
all the other players. Instead, we consider the problem
in which the players only communicate information
regarding their objectives and strategies to a set of
so-called neighbouring agents. We consider the case in
which the communication topology is fixed, i.e. it is
time invariant.
In this case the communication between the play-
ers can be represented by a time-invariant, directed
graph consisting of N nodes, labelled i, . . . , N , and
a set of edges: each node represents a player and
each edge represents a communication link between
two players. If player i communicates with player j
a directed edge exists from node i to node j and
player j is said to be a neighbour of player i. Note
that the communication is not necessarily bidirectional,
i.e. player j being a neighbour of player i does not
imply that player i is a neighbour of player j. Let
Ni denote the set of players which are neighbours
of player i.1 Let G denote the graph describing the
communication topology. In Figure 1 an example of a
graph describing the communication topology between
a set of 5 players is depicted. The arrows represent
the edges and the “direction” of the communication,
e.g. the arrow connecting node 3 and node 1 indicates
that player 3 shares its information with player 1.
In this case, for example, N1 = {2, 3, 5} and N2 =
{4}. Approaches based on graph theory are frequently
used to describe the communication between agents
in multi-agent systems as seen, for instance, in [25]
and references therein, where also a background on
graph theory is provided. For more examples on graph
theoretic methods and their applications to multi-agent
systems see, for example, [26], [27].
Let uj∈Ni denote the set of strategies of the neigh-
bours of the i-th player, i.e. uj∈Ni = {uj : j ∈ Ni}.
Given a communication topology, the cost functional2
of each player is given by
Ji(x(0), ui,uj∈Ni) ,
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x(t)) + αiui(t)
>ui(t)
+
∑
j∈Ni
αijuj(t)
>uj(t)
)
dt ,
(2)
where αi > 0 and αij are constant parameters, and
qi(x) ≥ 0 is a running cost satisfying qi(0) = 0, for
j ∈ Ni and i = 1, . . . , N .
In what follows we assume that the following state-
ment holds true
Assumption 1: The running costs in (2), i = 1, . . . , N
are such that
N∑
i=1
qi(x) > 0 ,
for all x 6= 0
Remark 1: If the communication links are not iden-
tical, for example if some players communicate more
easily with certain other players, a weighted graph can
be used to represent the communication topology.
Since the players do not have any informa-
tion regarding the objectives or strategies of non-
neighbouring players, each player must make cer-
tain assumptions regarding the strategies of its non-
neighbouring players. Suppose that the i-th player
assumes that uj(t) = u¯ij for all j = 1, . . . , N and j /∈ Ni.
That is, if the j-th player is not a neighbour of the i-th
player, the i-th player assumes that the strategy of the
j-th player is a certain function of the state x, which
we denote by u¯ij(x). Let u¯j/∈Ni denote the assumptions
1Ni is said to be the neighbouring set of player i and in this
definition of the set, a player is not said to be a neighbour of itself.
Note that alternative definitions exist.
2Note that the strategies of players which are not neighbours of
player i cannot appear in the cost functional associated with player
i since this information is only shared by neighbouring players.
Fig. 1. Example of graph representing communication between a
set of 5 players
the i-th player makes regarding the strategies of non-
neighbouring players, i.e. u¯j/∈Ni = {u¯ij(x) : j /∈ Ni}.
Remark 2: In some settings, for example in a stock
market or a distributed power grid, a player may not
be aware of the existence of all players. For example,
it is possible that the i-th player is aware of and shares
information with its neighbours only, whereas it is
unaware about the existence of the other players. This
setting could be described by the selection u¯ij(x) = 0
for all x and for all j /∈ Ni.
Using this setup the differential game with limited
communication can be defined as follows.
Problem 1: Consider the N -player differential game
characterised by the dynamical system (1), the cost
functionals (2), i = 1, . . . , N , the graph G and the
assumptions u¯ij for j /∈ Ni and i = 1, . . . , N . The
problem of solving the differential game with limited
communication lies in determining a set of feedback
strategies u∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N} which is such that the
origin of the system (1) in closed-loop with u∗ is
(locally) asymptotically stable. Furthermore, u∗ must
satisfy the inequalities
Ji(x(0), u
∗
i ,u
∗
j∈Ni , u¯j/∈Ni) ≤ Ji(x(0), ui,u∗j∈Ni , u¯j/∈Ni)
(3)
for all ui 6= u∗i such that the the origin of the
system (1) in closed-loop with the set of strategies
{ui,u∗j∈Ni ,u∗j∈Ni} is (locally) asymptotically stable, for
i = 1, . . . , N .
Remark 3: The inequalities (3) can be interpreted as
follows. If the i-th player assumes uj = u∗j for all j ∈ Ni
and uj = u¯ij for all j /∈ Ni, it cannot perform any better
by deviating from the strategy u∗i . The idea behind
this solution is similar to that of Nash equilibrium
solutions, but is here recast in a distributed setting.
Note that whereas a standard differential game
(when interested in Nash equilibirum solutions) is
characterised by the dynamics (1) and the cost func-
tionals (2), for i = 1, . . . , N , the differential game with
limited communication is characterised by the graph G
describing the communication topology and the set of
assumptions u¯ij(x), for all j /∈ Ni and i = 1, . . . , N , in
addition to the dynamics (1) and the cost functionals
(2), for i = 1, . . . , N .
III. SOLUTION TO THE DIFFERENTIAL GAME WITH
LIMITED COMMUNICATION
Using dynamic programming and the principle of
optimality sufficient conditions for a solution of Prob-
lem 1 to exist are given in this section [1], [28]. The
general nonlinear setting is described before the special
case of linear-quadratic differential games is consid-
ered. For simplicity we consider first the case in which
αij ≥ 0 in (2), for j ∈ Ni and i = 1, . . . , N . However,
the more general case can be considered using the
same arguments as will be remarked at the end of this
section.
A. Nonlinear setting
Consider Problem 1 and the system of partial differ-
ential equations (PDEs)
1
2
qi(x)− 1
2αi
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
> ∂Vi
∂x
+
∂Vi
∂x
f(x)
+
∑
j∈Ni
1
αj
∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
> ∂Vj
∂x
+
∑
j /∈Ni
∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)u¯ij(x)
+
1
2
∑
j∈Ni
αij
α2j
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)>gj(x)> ∂Vj
∂x
= 0 ,
(4)
where Vi(x) : Rn → R and Vi(0) = 0, for i = 1, . . . , N .
Theorem 1: Suppose we can find a solution to the
coupled PDEs (4), i = 1, . . . N , and suppose the solution
is such that
N∑
i=1
Vi(x) > 0 for all x 6= 0 and Vi(0) = 0
holds for all i = 1, . . . , N . Furthermore, suppose that
the solution is such that the condition
1
2
N∑
i=1
(
qi(x) +
1
αi
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
> ∂Vi
∂x
>)
+
1
2
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
αij
α2j
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
> ∂Vj
∂x
>
>
N∑
i=1
∑
j /∈Ni
1
αj
∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)
(
gj(x)
> ∂Vj
∂x
>
− αj u¯ij(x)
)
,
(5)
holds for all x 6= 0. Then the set of feedback strategies
given by
u∗i = −
1
αi
gi(x)
> ∂Vi
∂x
>
, (6)
for i = 1, . . . , N , is a solution to Problem 1.
Proof: The proof consists of two steps. Firstly it is
shown that the set of strategies (6), i = 1, . . . , N ,
are such that the inequalities (3) are satisfied for i =
1, . . . , N . Secondly it is shown that the zero equilibrium
of the closed-loop system is (locally) asymptotically
stable.
Each player can be associated with its Hamiltonian
function
Hi(x, λi, ui,uj∈Ni , u¯j/∈Ni)
=
1
2
qi(x) +
1
2
αiu
>
i ui +
1
2
∑
j∈Ni
αiju
>
j uj
+ λ>i
f(x) + gi(x)ui + ∑
j∈Ni
gj(x)uj +
∑
j /∈Ni
gj(x)u¯ij
 ,
(7)
where λi is the costate. The feedback strategy ui =
− 1
αi
gi(x)
>λi minimises the Hamiltonian associated
with the i-th player. It follows from the dynamic pro-
gramming principle that if a solution to the PDEs (4),
i = 1, . . . , N , can be found the set of strategies (6),
i = 1, . . . , N satisfies the inequalities (3).
It now remains to show that the origin is an equi-
librium of the closed-loop system (1)-(6). Let W (x) =
N∑
i=1
Vi(x) be a candidate Lyapunov function and note
that W (x) > 0 for all x 6= 0. The time derivative of the
function is given by
W˙ =
N∑
i=1
∂Vi
∂x
(
f(x) +
N∑
i=1
gi(x)u
∗
i
)
= −1
2
N∑
i=1
(
qi(x) +
1
αi
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
> ∂Vi
∂x
>)
− 1
2
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
αij
α2j
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
> ∂Vj
∂x
>
+
N∑
i=1
∑
j /∈Ni
1
αj
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
> ∂Vj
∂x
>
.
It follows from (5) that W˙ (x) < 0 for all x 6= 0. Closed-
loop stability of the origin follows from standard Lya-
punov arguments.
Remark 4: The coupled PDEs (4), i = 1, . . . , N , re-
semble the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs which are en-
countered in standard differential games [1], [2], [20].
However, the PDEs (4), i = 1, . . . N , contain terms
which rely on the assumptions made by the i-th player
regarding the strategies of non-neighbouring players,
i.e. they rely on u¯ij for j /∈ Ni, instead of the actual
strategies adopted by the non-neighbouring players,
as is the case with the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs
PDEs.
Remark 5: The inequality (5) provides a sufficient
condition for W˙ < 0 for all x 6= 0. Note that for the
case in which there is full communications between all
players,
u¯ij = u
∗
j = −
1
αj
gj(x)
> ∂Vj
∂x
>
,
for j /∈ Ni and i = 1, . . . , N . In this case the right-hand-
side of the inequality (5) is zero and the inequality is
trivially satisfied by Assumption 1.
B. Linear-Quadratic setting
Consider the case in which the dynamics (1) is linear,
i.e.
x˙ = Ax+
N∑
i=1
Biui ,
where A ∈ Rn×n and Bi ∈ Rn×mi , i = 1, . . . , N ,
are constant matrices, whereas the running costs are
quadratic, i.e. they are of the form qi(x) = x>Qix,
where Qi ∈ Rn×n and Qi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N . In optimal
control and standard differential games this linear-
quadratic setting leads to the linear regulator problem
and linear-quadratic differential games, respectively.
Both problems have been extensively studied in the
literature: see, for example, [16], [29]. The reasons for
considering this special case are twofold. Firstly, as
it is seen with linear regulator problems and stan-
dard linear-quadratic differential games, the PDEs (4)
can be replaced by algebraic Riccati equations (AREs).
Secondly, since these matrix equations are sometimes3
more readily solved than the PDEs (4) this special
case can help provide a better understanding of the
condition (5) of Theorem 1.
As is commonly done when considering standard
linear-quadratic differential games, see for example
[29], [30], we limit our attention to linear feedback
strategies. Thus, suppose u¯ij(x) = U¯ijx, where U¯ij ∈
Rn×mj , for i = 1, . . . , N , j /∈ Ni and j = 1, . . . , N .
The PDEs (4), i = 1, . . . , N can then be replaced by the
algebraic Riccati-like equations
PiA+A
>Pi +Qi − 1
αi
PiBiB
>
i Pi +
∑
j∈Ni
αij
α2j
PjBjB
>
j Pj
−
∑
j∈Ni
1
αj
PiBjB
>
j Pj −
∑
j∈Ni
1
αj
PjBjB
>
j Pi
+
∑
j /∈Ni
(
PiBjU¯ij + U¯
>
ijB
>
j Pi
)
= 0 .
(8)
In this special case Theorem 1 reduces the following
statement.
3For the case in which N > 1 solving the coupled algebraic Riccati
equations characterising a linear-quadratic differential game is not
trivial and has been given attention in the literature for differential
games with full communication. See, for example, [29].
Proposition 1: Suppose we can find a solution to the
AREs such that
N∑
i=1
Pi > 0 and
N∑
i=1
Qi + 1
αi
PiBiB
>
i Pi +
∑
j∈Ni
αij
α2j
PjBjB
>
j Pj

>
N∑
i=1
∑
j /∈Ni
1
αj
PiBj
(
B>j Pj − U¯ij
)
+
N∑
i=1
∑
j /∈Ni
1
αj
(
PjBj − U¯>ij
)
B>j Pi .
(9)
Then the set of linear feedback strategies
u∗i = −
1
αj
B>i Pix , (10)
i = 1, . . . , N , solves Problem 1.
Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorem 1
with Vi = 12x
>Pix, for i = 1, . . . N .
Remark 6: If U¯ij = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N , j /∈ Ni and
j = 1, . . . , N , (8), i = 1, . . . , N are standard algebraic
Riccati-type equations. In Section IV a problem involv-
ing this scenario is considered.
Remark 7: It is possible to consider the case in which
αij < 0 for some j ∈ Ni, i = 1, . . . , N . However, in this
case some additional care must be taken to ensure that
W (x) > 0 for all x 6= 0.
IV. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To illustrate the theoretical results in Section III a
numerical example is presented. In particular a linear-
quadratic problem which can be interpreted in a multi-
agent setting is considered.
Consider the case in which N = 3. Each player is
an agent described by its position pi(t) ∈ R2. Suppose
the players satisfy single-integrator dynamics, namely
p˙i = ui, where ui(t) ∈ R2 is the control strategy of the
i-th player. Suppose the first player seeks to reach a
target p∗1 ∈ R2 whereas the remaining two players seek
to reach certain distances relative to the first player. The
relative distances are defined by the vectors r12 and
r13 for second and third agents, respectively. Suppose
the players share information regarding their objectives
and strategies according to the (directed) graph shown
in Figure 2 and, furthermore, suppose αi = 1, i = 1, 2, 3
and αij = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N , j ∈ Niand j = 1, . . . , N .
This scenario is similar in spirit to the prob-
lems considered in [15], albeit here with lim-
ited communication. Defining the state as x =(
(p1 − p∗1)>, ((p2 − p1)− r12)>, ((p3 − p1)− r13)>
)> the
problem can be formulated as the differential game
with limited communication characterised by the state
dynamics
x˙ = B1u1 +B2u2 +B3u3 ,
Fig. 2. Graph representing the communication topology in the 3-
player example.
with4 B1 = [I,−I,−I], B2 = [0, I, 0] and B3 = [0, 0, I],
the cost functionals (2) with running costs qi(x) =
x>Qix, for i = 1, . . . , N , and the graph shown in Figure
2. Finally it is assumed that u¯ij(x) = 0 for all x and for
all j /∈ Ni, j = 1, 2, 3 and j 6= i, for i = 1, 2, 3. Thus
the problem can be described as the linear-quadratic
differential game considered in Section III-B.
Let x =
(
x>1 , x
>
2 , x
>
3
)> and consider the case in which
Q1 =
 4I 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 , Q2 =
 I 0 00 2I 0
0 0 0
 ,
Q3 =
 I 0 00 0 0
0 0 4I
 .
These running costs can be interpreted as follows.
Whereas the first player is only interested in reaching
the target p∗1, the second and third player are interested
in reaching the desired positions relative the the first
player as well as being interested in the first player reach-
ing the target5. This could, for example, be understood
in the context of the movement of a formation in
which a leader seeks to reach a target for the group,
whereas the followers seek to reach the target for the
group while reaching and maintaining certain positions
relative to the leader.
It follows that the matrices
P1 =
 2I 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 , P2 =
 I I 0I 2I 0
0 0 0
 ,
P3 =
 I 0 I0 0 0
I 0 2I
 ,
satisfy the coupled AREs (8), i = 1, 2, 3. Note that it
can easily be seen that the matrices are such that the
conditions (9) are satisfied for all i = 1, 2, 3. The linear
feedback strategies (10) satisfying (3), for i = 1, 2, 3, are
4The identity and zero matrices are denoted by I and 0, respec-
tively.
5Collisions are not taken into consideration in this example.
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Fig. 3. Time histories of the first (solid lines) and second (dashed
lines) of x1 (top), x2 (middle) and x3 (bottom) corresponding to the
first scenario.
then given by
u1 = −2x>1 ,
u2 = −(x>1 + 2x>2 ) ,
u3 = −(x>1 + 2x3) .
(11)
Remark 8: Due to the structure of problem, i.e. the
structure of Bi and Qi (and hence also of Pi) for i =
1, 2, 3, in addition to not communicating information
regarding their objectives and strategies the players do
not require full information regarding the state x. In
particular, as seen in (11) the second player does not
require knowledge of the position of the third player
and vice versa.
Simulations of the closed-loop system (1)-(10), i =
1, 2, 3, have been run for two scenarios, the results of
which are presented in what follows.
Consider first the scenario in which p1(0) =
(−6,−5)>, p2(0) = (−5,−7)> and p3(0) = (−5, 0)>,
and the desired final positions are determined by the
vectors p∗1 = (10, 10)
>, r12 = (−2, 0)> and r13 =
(0,−2)>. The time histories of the first (solid lines) and
second (dashed lines) of the states x1 (top), x2 (middle)
and x3 (bottom) are shown in Figure 3. Note that the
states converge to x = 0 as expected. The trajectories
of the players on the x, y-plane, i.e. p1 (solid line), p2
(dashed line) and p3 (dotted line) are shown in Figure
4. The square and circular markers indicate the initial
and final positions of the players, respectively, whereas
the arrows indicate the direction of travel.
Consider now a second scenario in which p1(0) =
(−1, 1)>, p2(0) = (−5, 5)> and p3(0) = (−5,−5)>,
whereas p∗1, r12 and r13 are as in the previous scenario.
The time histories of the first (solid lines) and second
(dashed lines) of the states x1 (top), x2 (middle) and
x3 (bottom) are shown in Figure 5. The trajectories
of the three players are shown in Figure 6 where the
solid, dashed and dotted lines indicate the first, second
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−4
−2
0
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10
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y
Fig. 4. Time trajectories of p1 (solid line), p2 (dashed line) and
p3 (dotted line) on the x, y-plane corresponding the first scenario.
Square and circular markers denote the initial and final positions of
the players, whereas arrows indicate the direction of travel.
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Fig. 5. Time histories of the first (solid lines) and second (dashed
lines) of x1 (top), x2 (middle) and x3 (bottom) corresponding to the
second scenario.
and third player, respectively. The square and circular
markers indicate the initial and final positions of the
players and the arrows indicate the direction of travel.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A differential game with limited communication is
considered in this paper: the communication topology
is represented by a directed graph. The problem is
formally defined and sufficient conditions for a solution
are presented in both the general nonlinear setting
and the linear-quadratic setting. A numerical example
describing a multi-agent system is then introduced to
illustrate the results.
Some directions for future research are as follows.
It is of interest to derive weaker conditions than that
in (5). This is interesting from both a theoretical and
practical point-of-view: several applications which can
be modeled as in the differential game framework are
subject to limited communications and, in some cases,
it may be difficult to satisfy the conditions presented
in this paper. It is also of interest to study the impact
which the communication topology has on how easily
−5 0 5 10
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y
Fig. 6. Time trajectories of p1 (solid line), p2 (dashed line) and p3
(dotted line) on the x, y-plane corresponding to the second scenario.
Square and circular markers denote the initial and final positions of
the players, whereas arrows indicate the direction of travel.
a solution to the PDEs (4) (or the AREs (8) in the
linear-quadratic case), i = 1, . . . , N , can be found and
whether the conditions (5) (or (9) in the linear-quadratic
case), i = 1, . . . N are satisfied. In the first instance,
this will be done by considering specific problems and
exploring the effect which the communication topol-
ogy has on these problems. Finally, since closed-form
solutions to the PDEs (4), i = 1, . . . , N , are usually not
readily obtainable it is desirable to develop methods
of systematically constructing approximate solutions,
possibly in the spirit of the methods developed in [20]
for standard differential games and in [31] for optimal
control problems.
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